



Dick Byrne is Professor of 
Evolutionary Psychology at 
the University of St. Andrews, 
Scotland. He studies the evolution 
of cognition, and has investigated 
a wide range of animal 
capacities — vocal and gestural 
communication, deception, 
social comprehension, mental 
mapping, causal knowledge and 
the acquisition of novel manual 
skills. After training in cognitive 
psychology, he turned to primate 
fieldwork, with studies of African 
baboons, chimpanzees and 
gorillas. More recently, his focus 
has broadened to include other 
mammal species, collaborating 
with specialists to undertake 
experimental work on domestic 
pigs, and analysis of observational 
data on social cognition in 
the African elephant. Dick has 
frequently challenged assumptions 
within psychology that relate all 
subtleties of human behaviour to 
language, and his work has done 
much to bring evolutionary biology 
back to psychology. His book “The 
Thinking Ape” (OUP, 1995) was 
awarded the British Psychological 
Society’s book prize. 
Have you always been interested 
in biology? As a child, I was excited 
by biological diversity, and my 
father’s knowledge and enthusiasm 
for natural history meant that I got a 
good grounding in field biology. Bird 
watching became my hobby, as it 
still is. Birding has rather a nerdy 
image: everyone enjoys seeing a 
new bird and amateur record taking 
is important, so most birders end 
up with a lot of lists. But for me 
the excitement lies in phylogenetic 
novelty, not numbers: I suppose I’m 
still hooked on diversity. Nor has 
my interest ever focused on birds to 
the exclusion of other wildlife, and 
it has been a great pleasure to be 
able to conduct African fieldwork 
in environments where the largest 
animal is not a swan — and to be 
able to call it work!
How did you end up working 
on animal cognition? By rather a winding path: the unkind would 
say it shows the career planning 
of a grasshopper. My best school 
subject was English, and it was 
only my ineptitude with languages 
that made me take a scientific path; 
in those days, combining arts and 
science was anathema in schools. 
I went up to Cambridge to read 
physics. At Cambridge, physics is 
taken as part of natural sciences, 
and everyone studies a range of 
subsidiary subjects. That allowed 
me to discover the fascination 
of using cognitive psychology 
to understand the human mind, 
with the advantage that it did not 
require Bessel functions, tensor 
algebra or gyroscope theory. I had 
the good fortune to have Donald 
Broadbent as my undergraduate 
supervisor, and he encouraged me 
to go on to Ph.D. work, when I was 
especially lucky to be supervised by 
John Morton, at the MRC Applied 
Psychology Unit in Cambridge 
(now the Cognitive Brain Research 
Unit). John allowed no pretension 
or waffle, and his unusual style 
of supervision was perfect for 
building individual confidence and 
a healthy scepticism of received 
wisdom. When interviewed for 
a lectureship at St. Andrews I 
suspect I did almost everything 
wrong, but Malcolm Jeeves 
nevertheless insisted on appointing 
me to his rather new psychology 
department — and I’ve not looked 
back. But when I first arrived I was 
nursing serious dissatisfaction 
with psychology’s then refusal to 
use everyday behaviour as a data 
source for theory building and 
testing. It seemed to me that many 
cherished models of behaviour 
could be rejected as inadequate 
or misconceived just by using the 
observations of normal life. In fact, 
I was ripe to discover ethology, the 
scientific study of natural behaviour, 
and by sheer luck had ended up 
in the only British psychology 
department where people were 
studying animal behaviour in the 
field! Even so, this might never have 
got beyond an amateur enthusiasm 
if it had not been for the generosity 
of Bill McGrew, then at Stirling. 
He took the considerable gamble 
of letting an untried cognitive 
psychologist loose at his field site 
in the extreme east of Senegal, to 
work on baboon vocalizations.What do you enjoy about 
research? The chance to study the 
infinite variety in animal behaviour, 
combined with the challenge of 
building cognitive models of what 
is going on, makes a heady mix 
and there’s no sign of boredom on 
the horizon. Using the comparative 
method to infer the evolutionary 
history of cognitive capacities 
allows the data of animal cognition 
to feed in directly to modelling 
human cognitive evolution. 
(Conveniently justifying my salary 
in a psychology department.) I’m 
not sure if I would still be doing it, 
though, if I had not discovered in 
Senegal how enjoyable it could be 
to collect that data. When working 
on human subjects, I had always 
been in a hurry to graph the results 
and test my current theory, whereas 
following large animals in the field 
is a pleasure in itself, working 
surrounded by the biological 
richness of a tropical environment. 
And with species like gorillas and 
elephants, the animals’ social lives 
are a good deal more exciting 
to observe than Neighbours or 
EastEnders. That makes a day 
painstakingly recording sequences 
of manual action or inter-animal 
proximity into a day with a story to 
tell in the evening.
Fieldwork can’t be all fun: do you 
remember some bad moments? 
To be honest, trackless African 
bush is probably a lot safer than 
many parts of British cities. Animal 
encounters make for good stories, 
but the big risks are from people. 
That said, living conditions can be 
a bit disconcerting. In Senegal, we 
lived in comfortable mud-walled 
huts, mine shared with a night 
adder, a little back-fanged viper, 
not dangerous but potentially 
very painful so I had to be careful 
where I trod. Our ‘bath’ was a slight 
widening in a tiny stream, and I was 
warned to be careful of a spitting 
cobra that lived on the path down. 
In fact, the first time we met, the big 
snake was moving into the other 
end of my bath, so I stood up very 
quickly, feeling pretty silly! 
Encounters when travelling 
in thick vegetation can be more 
serious. Baboon troops are 
wonderful predator-detection 
systems, so I was never at any 
danger of bumping into a lion 
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ignore elephants, and the first time 
I realized that I was (too) close 
to an elephant group was while 
wondering why there were so 
many grey tree-trunks amongst the 
baboon party I was following. In 
Rwanda, the gorillas my wife and 
I were following disturbed a nest 
of African ‘killer’ bees. The gorillas 
made themselves scarce, smartly, 
leaving us to meet the angry bees. 
As experienced Africa hands, we 
naturally panicked and fled, to the 
amusement of the local tracker, 
wiser in the ways of bees, who 
showed us that if one lies flat on the 
ground the bees soon give up. 
And sometimes it can feel as if 
the study animals have a perverse 
desire to make you suffer. To locate 
mountain gorillas, we had to rely 
on a skilled tracker to follow their 
trail. Often this took only a couple 
of hours, but sometimes a group 
took four or five hours to re-locate. 
We would plod up and down with 
no sign to us of any gorilla having 
been nearby, only to be suddenly 
among them… and realize that we 
were now only a kilometre from 
camp, having gone on a huge loop! 
Mountain baboons in South Africa 
were almost as inconsiderate. We 
needed to be with the group at 
dawn to avoid losing them for the 
day, so if they were sleeping 1000 m 
above our hut, we had to struggle 
up the mountain slopes in near-
darkness. This dedication was often 
rewarded with a rapid move by the 
study animals — downwards — and 
an hour later they would pass 
within a few metres of the hut! But 
these occasional frustrations are 
the exceptions, in what has to be 
admitted is a pretty pleasant way to 
collect one’s data.
Do you have a scientific 
hero? To me, one of the most 
impressive traits, found in only a 
few scientists, is the ability to take 
a novel intellectual trail, ignoring 
superficialities and steadily work 
out the implications of a theory, 
however strange. In physics, there 
are some obvious examples. 
Einstein worked out what it would 
be like to travel on a beam of light, 
thereby developing relativity theory. 
Dirac unified wave and particle 
views of matter in an equation 
for the electron that gave two solutions, positive and negative, 
so predicting the first antiparticle, 
the positron. In biology, that sort of 
imagination is rarer, and most of us 
manage quite well without. But Bill 
Hamilton could think like that, and 
for me his theoretical development 
of the social implications of the 
genetical theory of natural selection 
is the cornerstone of our modern 
understanding of animal behaviour. 
He was also a wonderfully nice 
man. I was lucky to spend a little 
time with him at a Brazilian research 
station, cleverly built to float in the 
varzea forest during the annual 
flood. Bill’s interest in the intricate 
interaction of pollinators and trees 
had him paddling off in a dugout 
every morning before breakfast 
to check his insect traps, and his 
enthusiasm was infectious. I was 
amazed one day to see my wife 
Jen coming back with him — she 
loathes wobbly little canoes in 
turbulent waters. Bill’s excitement 
had carried her along regardless, 
and she’d spent a happy time 
looking at insects and plants. Bill’s 
early death was a terrible loss, and 
he is much missed.
Have you seen attitudes 
change? When I was an 
undergraduate, biology’s impact on 
psychology was entirely at the level 
of causal mechanism. Animals 
were useful models for studying 
things like lateral inhibition in the 
eye and the properties of synaptic 
vesicles and neurotransmitters, 
but when it came to cognition 
the gulf seemed unbridgeable. 
Behaviourism had utterly failed 
as an account of normal human 
behaviour, Chomsky’s review had 
trashed Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, 
and comparative psychologists 
worked only with the Rat, the 
Pigeon and the Monkey, as if 
a scala natura could be found. 
Everywhere else in psychology, 
the cognitive revolution had taken 
over with the work of people like 
Dick Neisser, Herb Simon and Allan 
Newell, and progress was rapid. 
Inspiration came from computers 
and artificial intelligence, not 
animals. Understandably, in such a 
climate, my cognitive psychology 
colleagues thought it mad of 
me to give up a career studying 
human memory to watch a bunch 
of baboons. Now, those attitudes have largely changed. Animal 
cognition, often primate fieldwork 
in particular, is a key part of many 
British psychology departments’ 
portfolio. Exploring cognitive 
evolution by means of comparative 
study of animal behaviour, 
both in the field and in captive 
environments, is now seen as a 
sensible part of the big picture. 
Some of the credit for this sea 
change must be due to advances 
in molecular taxonomy. On the 
one hand, data from the human 
genome project have shown that 
all humans are astonishingly similar 
genetically despite superficial 
differences: thus destroying the 
spectre of racial determinism. On 
the other, comparative biochemical 
analyses have shown that humans 
are not just ‘related’ to primates, 
they are intimately embedded in 
the phylogeny of great apes, more 
closely related to chimpanzees 
than chimpanzees are to gorillas 
and orangutans. But I think that 
the study of animal cognition 
has also contributed, in showing 
psychologists that human 
‘uniqueness’ is really a complex 
mosaic of attributes, which can 
often be pulled apart by tracing 
human-like abilities in other 
species. 
Do you have a pet hate? I find 
the usual portrayal of science on 
television pretty dismal: chopping 
everything into 10 second visual 
bites, with lots of men in labs with 
white coats and test-tubes. The 
style impedes a viewer’s effort 
to understand ideas even when 
the spoken commentary is good. 
Radio does a better job, on the 
whole, but even there a frequent 
focus on the controversial and 
the weird —strange and charmed 
particles, the brain centre for 
religion — doesn’t help the public’s 
view of scientific progress. This 
leaves all the excitement of whole-
animal biology to natural history 
programming, which admittedly 
often does a great job but people 
may not even associate this 
entertainment with science, and 
regrettably the focus has recently 
been shifting from the animals to 
the presenters. 
Does animal cognition have 






What is meant by 
‘phylogenomics’? I’m afraid it 
depends rather on whom you 
ask: The majority of recent papers 
referring to phylogenomics 
are studies using large sets of 
sequence data of aligned genes 
from genome and expressed 
sequence tag (EST) projects. These 
data are used to infer evolutionary 
trees of relationships between the 
sequences and the organisms 
they are derived from; such trees 
are known as phylogenies. While 
this is my preferred definition, and 
the focus of this article, it must be 
admitted that the earliest published 
mentions of phylogenomics refer 
instead to a mixed bag of analyses 
of genes and genomes within a 
phylogenetic framework. In my 
view, the first definition seems 
to make slightly more sense 
etymologically, while the latter 
might be better described, with a 
nod to ‘evo-devo’, as ‘evolutionary 
genomics’.
What’s the general idea? 
The phylogenomic approach 
makes use of the huge number 
of genes discovered by genome 
projects and by EST-sequencing 
efforts to provide very large sets 
of aligned genes. These large 
datasets address a major problem 
encountered when reconstructing 
phylogenies from sequences of 
nucleotides and amino acids called 
stochastic or sampling error. In 
essentially all gene datasets there 
will be a proportion of nucleotide 
or amino acid positions that are 
misleading due to homoplasies — 
identical substitutions occurring 
convergently in independent 
lineages erroneously suggesting 
common inheritance. The smaller 
the dataset, the greater is the 
chance that — at least for some 
parts of the tree — a greater 
number of misleading, homoplastic 
nucleotides rather than honest, 
informative nucleotides will be 
sampled. The largest  
pre-phylogenomic alignments 
consisted of perhaps 10 genes, 
whereas a typical phylogenomic 
alignment nowadays will comprise 
between 50 and several hundred 
genes.
How do you go about it? Given 
the rapidly increasing numbers 
of whole genome sequences and 
collections of ESTs, the problem 
becomes one of bioinformatics.  
The first and trickiest step is to build 
up sets of orthologous genes. This 
is most simply done by identifying a 
reciprocal best match. Starting with 
a gene from a reference species a 
BLAST search is used to identify 
the closest significant match 
from each of the other species of 
interest. Using this closest match to 
perform a reciprocal BLAST search 
against the reference species 
should select the original reference 
gene as top hit — provided the 
two genes are true orthologues, 
i.e. related through speciation, and 
not paralogues, i.e. related by gene 
duplication as well as speciation. 
The second step is then to align 
each set of orthologues and 
concatenate them into a super-
alignment. At this stage, taxa for 
which no orthologue has been 
found are included in the alignment 
as a sequence of question marks 
representing missing data. Finally, 
model-based phylogenetic analyses 
(Maximum Likelihood/­Bayesian) are 
applied to the super-alignment.
Are missing data a problem? 
Often certain genes in the 
alignment will not be found in 
the raw data from all species. 
Fortunately, missing data are not 
positively misleading. That said, 
it is a legitimate and common 
practice to merge genes from 
different members of clearly defined 
monophyletic groups, such as 
species of the genus Drosophila, 
to create a composite taxon, 
Drosophila spp., with fewer missing 
data.
Any other considerations? The 
size of phylogenomic data sets 
makes it possible to discard genes 
or parts of genes with undesirable 
characteristics, such as uneven 
rates of nucleotide or amino acid 
substitution across taxa or strong 
biases in base or amino acid don’t need to be told a reason 
for conserving species, but for 
many people (including those with 
the most money), the case does 
need to be made. Discovering 
and illustrating the remarkable 
cognitive abilities of a species can 
increase its value in conservation 
terms. Gorillas, chimpanzees 
and elephants are all expensive 
to conserve and endangered 
in the wild, and we owe them a 
fair portrayal. An unsentimental 
approach to animal welfare 
also depends on the proper 
understanding of a species’ mental 
capacity. But ‘talking up’ the 
abilities of our favourite species is 
bound to backfire in the end, so 
careful science should never be set 
aside in favour of highly coloured 
simplification.
What do you plan to do next 
in your research? It has made 
good sense for evolutionary 
psychologists to devote special 
attention to our own order, 
the primates, in order to trace 
capacities we share by common 
descent. Recent work in other 
groups, for instance, corvids 
and cetaceans, has shown that 
convergent cases of advanced 
cognitive skill also exist, and these 
point to environmental conditions 
that select for cognitive rather than 
anatomical specialization. But I 
think we have all focused on  
large-brained species too much. 
(My own recent work on the 
African elephant, in collaboration 
with Cynthia Moss’s 35-year 
project in Amboseli, is a case in 
point!) Of course, species have 
large brains for a reason, so 
the results are more likely to be 
exciting, but unless we also study 
cognition in more average species 
it will be impossible to interpret the 
special cases in an evolutionary 
framework. For that reason, I’m 
happy to be collaborating with 
Mike Mendl and Suzanne Held on 
the cognition of domestic pigs, 
and in the future I’d hope to study 
cognition in more modest species 
still, even reptiles and insects. 
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